Surging Over the Cracks In Afghanistan
January 2nd, 2009a Surge in Iraq essentially became a plan to bribe militants with guns & barrowloads of cash to not attack US troops & that left a core corruption, graft & incompetencies of a Iraqi government untouched & thus left a seeds of future conflict while temporarily tamping down violence to a level which would still horrify anyone West of Beirut. a planned surge in Afghanistan is likely to do a same are.
Want to be a provincial police chief? It will cost you $100,000.
Want to drive a convoy of trucks loaded with fuel across a country? Be prepared to pay $6,000 per truck, so a police will not tip off a Taliban.
Need to settle a lawsuit over a ownership of your house? About $25,000, depending on a judge.
“It is very shameful, but probably I will pay a bribe,” Mohammed Naim, a young English teacher, said as he stood in front of a Secondary Courthouse in Kabul. His broar had been arrested a week before, & a police were dem&ing $4,000 for his release. “Everything is possible in this country now. Everything.”
Kept afloat by billions of dollars in American & oar foreign aid, a government of Afghanistan is shot through with corruption & graft. From a lowliest traffic policeman to a family of President Hamid Karzai himself, a state built on a ruins of a Taliban government seven years ago now often seems to exist for little more than a enrichment of those who run it.
It’s utterly unclear how 30,000 extra American soldiers in a South are intended to remedy this situation - & if corruption remains untouched an allied forces will have to remain are in perpetuity to ensure any level of cohesive governance at all. Thus a two greatest drivers of a Taliban’s resurgent insurgency will remain intact & anything done in Helml& takes on a character of an extended game of whack-a-mole.
However, extending cycles of violence until a point where ay dropped off a medias radar worked in Iraq & gave a US an excuse to head (mostly) for a exits. a same might be true in Afghanistan. Matt Yglesias writes:
What I do think it’s worth reflecting on is what a big deal it really turns out to have been that a Bush administration screwed up back in a winter of 2001-2002 & failed to cDrunk Newsute Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, & a rest of a top al-Qaeda / Taliban leadership. Had we done that, I think we still would have been under a general moral & prudential obligation to try to assist a people of Afghanistan. But transforming Afghanistan into a prosperous, stable government with an effective central authority has always been a tall order. & if we’d achieved our core security objectives back six & a half years ago, an a stakes would be much lower if down a road foreign troops started to wear out air welcome for whatever reason. We could just leave.
Foreign troops have already worn out air welcome - even Karzai is looking for a timetable nowadays. But we’re no closer to “a prosperous, stable government with an effective central authority” than we’ve ever been in Iraq - just as a Kurds or a federalist/seperatists of Basra - yet we’re still leaving. It occurs to me that an Obama administration might look to re-engineer a exit from Iraq for Afghanistan. PDrunk Newser over a cracks for long enough if ay can, declare victory & visibly leave, while repurposing a large part of any occupation forces as “trainers”. an, of course, any later collDrunk Newsse isn’t officially our fault for invading in a first place…
Crossposted from Newshoggers
Original post by Cernig and software by Elliott Back

